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1. Introduction 
The number of skilled migrants - and their share in total world wide migration - has risen 
dramatically in recent decades. Docquier and Rapoport (2004) report that the number of 
migrants residing in OECD countries increased by 50 percent between 1990 and 2000, with the 
increase in the number of skilled migrants equal to 2.5 times that of unskilled (70 percent versus 
28 percent). The figures for the period 2001-2007 suggest that the share of skilled migrants is 
further increasing (ILO 2008).  
In order to quantify high skill migration, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) calculate a selection 
indicator, which is given by the proportion of skilled (defined as migrants with tertiary 
education) emigrants in the total emigration stock. Selection rates in 2000 among emigrants were 
the highest in Croatia (29.4%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (28.6%), Albania (20.0%), Serbia and 
Montenegro (17.4%), Slovakia (15.3%), Romania (14.1%), Estonia (13.9%), Poland (12.3%), 
Hungary (12.1%), Lithuania (11.8%) and Latvia (10.2%): Only in the Czech Republic it was 
below 10% of emigrants. 
These figures suggest that migration of the best educated and most talented workers is an evident 
phenomenon cross-over the Europe. The vast majority of highly skilled flow from East to West, 
although the return migration is increasing, particularly in the fastest growing Eastern 
economies. Given that human capital is an important determinant of economic growth, high skill 
migration may increase the development gap between East and West. In this study we investigate 
if and how high skill migration may affect the economic growth in Eastern Europe. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Economic growth is one of the key policy priorities for most of the (democratic) transition 
countries in Eastern Europe. In this section we introduce the theoretical framework which will be 
used for analysing the impact of high skill emigration on long-run growth in the East. First, we 
present key findings of the recent growth theories with respect to human capital as the key 
driving force of economic development. Second, from the endogenous growth theory we derive 
an innovation production function for a closed economy. Next, drawing on findings from 
international labour migration and knowledge spillover literature, we augment the closed 
economy innovation production function to an open economy model. Finally, we decompose the 
open economy innovation accumulation function into four key components: worker education, 
international labour migration, national knowledge creation through research and development 
and international knowledge spillovers. 
2.1 The framework of innovative capital 
The main reason for choosing the innovative capital framework for our study is that to date there 
is no single, coherent theory of international labour migration available fully capturing high skill 
migration impacts on economic growth. Only a fragmented set of theories exist that have 
developed largely in isolation from one another segmented by disciplinary boundaries (Lucas 
2004). 
Differences between the East and West growth trends and patterns in high skill migration, 
however, suggest that a full understanding of the relationship between high skill migration and 
economic growth cannot be achieved by relying on the tools of one model alone, or by focusing 
on selected aspects such as brain drain stressed by the neoclassical theory, brain gain/waste 
emphasised by the 'new migration theory', Diaspora’s role in knowledge spillovers stressed by 
migration network theory. Instead, its complex, multifaceted nature requires an integrated 
approach that incorporates the variety of effects, forces, and assumptions into one single 
framework. By adopting the innovative capital framework we attempt to integrate all key effects 
and forces of high skill migration on economic development emphasised by different theories in 
one unified framework. 
Innovative capital in general and human capital in particular takes a central role in most theories 
of economic growth and development. Both the augmented neo-classical growth model and most 
of the endogenous growth models stress the importance of innovative capital in economic 
development. However, different schools of growth theory propose different functional 
relationships between the growth rate of national income and innovative capital. With respect to 
the role of innovative capital, growth models can be regrouped into two strands of theoretical 
views. 
According to the neo-classical growth theory, the accumulation of human capital as a factor of 
production drives economic growth, implying that differences in levels of human capital are 
related to differences in output levels across countries (Solow 1956, Mankiw et al. 1992). 
According to the endogenous growth theory, a greater human capital stock affects economic 
growth mainly by facilitating innovation and adoption of new technologies, implying that 
differences in the levels of human capital cause differences in output growth across countries 
(Nelson and Phelps 1966, Lucas 1988, Romer 1990). In contrast to the neo-classical growth 
theory, in which the long run growth is exogenously determined by technological change, 
endogenous growth models explain the level of economic growth within the model. 
The two most widely applied endogenous growth models are Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). 
Lucas (1988) models human capital in a firm's production function in a manner analogous to the 
augmented Solow model (private margin of innovative capital). However, in addition, he 
introduces an 'external' (social margin of innovative capital), whereby the average level of 
human capital in the economy affects individual firms' output but is not taken account of in their 
profit-maximisation decisions. In the context of our study an important feature of Lucas (1988) 
model is that even if there is no positive knowledge spillover effect, long run growth is 
determined by investment in both physical and human capital. 
The second major strand of endogenous growth theories was pioneered by Romer (1990). The 
growth model of Romer has three sectors: a technology producing sector, an intermediate goods 
producing sector where capital goods are produced, and a final output producing sector. In his 
model the steady state growth additionally depends on the human capital stock. The part of 
human capital that is not used for producing goods and services is used for creating new 
technologies. The level of human capital, LH , has thus a positive effect on the growth of 
knowledge, K , the stock of which determines the number of differentiated intermediate goods, 
x . According to the Romer's (1990) model, the innovation sector operates according to a national 
innovation production function: 
İ  1LHa☺1 K☺2  
 
where İ  is a sustainable rate of innovation and 1 is a productivity parameter. The sustainable rate 
of innovation, İ , is an increasing function of the number of skilled workers, LHa , and the stock 
of knowledge available to these skilled workers, K . Thus, in the Romer's (1990) model the rate 
of technological change is endogenous in two distinct ways. First, the share of the economy 
devoted to the innovation sector is a function of the skilled workforce (determining LHa ), and 
the allocation of resources to innovative activities depends on the R&D productivity. Second, the 
productivity of innovation creation is sensitive to the stock of knowledge capital, K , created by 
past innovations. 
Although, there is neither a general agreement on the precise values of these parameters nor on 
the functional form linking innovation to economy-wide long-term productivity growth, there is 
a relatively broad agreement that these are the key factors in explaining the realised level of 
economy-wide innovation (Furman, Porter and Stern 2002). 
2.2 Innovation accumulation function 
The closed economy innovation production function can be derived straightforwardly from 
Romer (1990). Applying a logarithmic transformation and rewriting the growth rate in form of 
stock changes we obtain closed economy innovation production: 
lnI  1☺1 lnLH ☺2 lnK  
 
According to equation (), the national innovative output, I , is an increasing function of the size 
of skilled workforce, LH , and the stock of knowledge available to workers, K . Given that the 
two innovative inputs are accumulable, their endowment is determined endogenously through 
equilibrium strategies of economic actors. The size of the human capital in the country is 
determined by the number of educated workers, LH . The stock of country knowledge capital 
depends on national research and development activities, K . The two coefficients (  and ) 
measure the relative contribution of the two innovative inputs: human capital and knowledge 
capital.
☺1 ☺2
2 1 is a productivity parameter, which captures all other factors affecting the creation of 
innovative capital but not captured by variables LH  and K . 
Next, we consider the innovative capital accumulation in an open economy. Empirical evidence 
and previous studies suggest that in an open economy, when international flows of human capital 
and knowledge capital are possible, the national innovative capital depends not only on country's 
endowment with skilled workers and the level of technological knowledge, but also on the net 
migration of skilled labour (Sjaastad 1962; Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975) and international 
knowledge spillovers (Krugman 1979). Therefore, we explicitly account for the net high skill 
migration which, depending on the sign, might augment or shrink locally educated workforce; 
and for international knowledge spillovers, which magnify the locally produced knowledge, by 
                                                            
2Parameter  determines whether the marginal product of an additional invention is increasing (the so-called 
'standing on shoulders' effect, 
☺1
Caballero and Jaffe 1993) or decreasing (the so-called 'fishing out' hypothesis) in the 
stock of human capital, and parameter  determines the returns to scale with respect to the stock of existing 
knowledge. 
☺2
including them in the innovative capital supply function. 
In order to account for international movements of innovative inputs, we introduce two new 
variables: LHm  denotes the net migration of skilled workers, and Km  denotes stock changes in 
technological knowledge due to cross-country knowledge spillovers.3 According to the 
underlying endogenous growth theory of Romer (1990), at least part of the technological 
knowledge is a public good (i.e. non-excludable and non-rival). This implies that cross-country 
spillovers of technological knowledge can only increase the national innovative capital creating a 
no-loose situation for both sending and receiving countries (KR 1 0, ).KS !0 4 In contrast, 
skilled labour is a rival input implying that international migration of skilled workers decreases 
its stock in the sending country and increases the stock of human capital in the receiving 
countries creating a win-lose situation for the receiving and sending countries, respectively 
(HR !0, ). Substituting the two new variables - skilled labour migration and 
international knowledge spillovers - we obtain the aggregate supply of innovative capital, 
HS 0
IS , in 
open economy S  :5
lnIS  ln1S ☺1 ln LHS  LHm ☺2 ln KS  Km
worker
education
high-skill
migration
domestic
innovation
knowledge
spillover
 
Open economy S  's innovative output, IS , depends on the number of workers who acquired skills 
through education, LHS , net migration of skilled workers, LHm , domestic knowledge creation 
through R&D, KS , national and international knowledge spillovers, Km , and parameters of the 
model.6 The relative contribution of the four components to national innovative supply, IS , 
depends on equilibrium strategies of economic actors. 
The innovative capital function suggest that among other factors country growth prospects 
depend on worker education, high skill migration, domestic R&D activities and knowledge 
spillovers. However, all four growth determinants are mutually related to each other. In the 
following section we analyse how high skill migration affects the four determinants of growth 
and hence the gap between East and West. 
                                                            
3Superscript  denotes migration. m
4Sending country is denoted with superscript S  and receiving country with superscript R. Similarly, skilled labour 
is denoted with subscript H  (human capital) and unskilled with subscript U  (unskilled). 
 
5The innovative capital framework derived here is similar to the innovative capacity approach of Furman, Porter 
and Stern (2002). 
6For the sake of simplicity, we assume that national knowledge spillovers, KSS , are already accounted for in the 
domestic knowledge production function, KS . 
3. The impact of skilled migration on innovative capital in the 
East 
In this section we investigate the impact of high skill migration on the four key drivers of 
economic growth derived above. Relying on the innovative capital framework, we show 
graphically and analyse theoretically how skilled labour migration affects the four determinants 
of national innovative capital: knowledge stock through worker education, long-run net 
migration of skilled workers, domestic knowledge creation activities and international 
knowledge spillovers. In line with empirical evidence, we assume that the Eastern sending 
countries are less developed than the Western receiving countries, and hence the skilled labour 
wage in East is lower than in West and the gap between Eastern and Western European countries 
exist. According to the traditional migration theory (Harris and Todaro 1970) wage differences 
trigger skilled migration - driven by higher expected earnings in receiving country, skilled 
workers migrate from East to West. Migration induces adjustments in the four growth 
determinants, which we analyse in the following sections. 
3.1 Migration impact on worker education 
Education is the most obvious way of augmenting human capital at home. Therefore, we start 
with open-economy education equilibrium, where we explicitly account for migration-induced 
adjustments through education. 
If liquidity constraint for entering education is not binding, we can distinguish between three 
sources of adjustments: changes in skilled/unskilled wage ratio at home, skill downgrading effect 
in the destination country, and education cost heterogeneity effect of differently able workers. A 
fourth source of migration-induced adjustments in education equilibrium is remittances, if 
liquidity constraint in the Eastern sending country is binding. 
First, we consider changes in relative wages in home country. If only skilled workers migrate or, 
equivalently, if more skilled workers migrate than unskilled, then the ratio of skilled/unskilled 
workers will decrease in the sending country. A declining supply of skilled labour compared to 
unskilled labour supply will exert an upward pressure on wage rate for skilled labour (see also 
section 3.2). Increased skilled/unskilled wage gap will induce additional unskilled workers to 
obtain education. Thus, home wage adjustments will increase the long run education equilibrium 
in the sending country. 
Second, we analyse the impact of receiving country's wage effect on worker education decision 
in the sending country. Several recent studies (Docquier and Rapoport 2004) find that migration 
prospects foster domestic enrolment in education as it increases expected return to the 
investment in education. The data presented in the table below confirms this hypothesis for the 
CEE countries. It has to be noted that in general enrolment in tertiary education is relatively high 
(and increasing) in most CEE countries. Though, there might be other reasons that influence the 
decision to invest in education than the prospect of emigration, particularly taking into account a 
phenomenon described below.  
Table 1: Gross rates in higher education enrolment, as a percentage of 19-24 year old population 
Countries 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria 26 26 27 28 30 34 35 34 35 35 33 31 32 32 34
Croatia 30 32 33 35
Czech Rep. 17 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 26 28 31 35 40 44
Estonia 34 32 29 28 29 32 35 38 43 45 51 62 63
Hungary 12 12 13 14 16 18 20 25 28 32 36 39 45 57 60
Latvia 21 21 19 18 18 22 31 36 42 47 53 60 63 65 64
Lithuania 27 23 21 21 21 23 26 31 34 39 44 54 58 62 66
Poland 17 17 19 21 24 27 31 35 39 43 46 51 52 54 56
Romania 9 11 13 14 14 18 19 19 21 23 27 30 33 34 36
Slovakia 14 14 15 15 17 18 20 20 22 23 23 31 32 33 36
Slovenia 23 26 26 28 30 31 34 44 51 53 58 67 70 74 80  
Source: OECD, UNICEF. 
According to empirical evidence from the Western European and North American destination 
countries (Mattoo et al. 2005, Drinkwater et al. 2006), only a small part of highly skilled 
immigrants are employed in skilled jobs. Usually, the majority of skilled migrants from East 
work in sectors requiring little qualification, such as agriculture, transport or construction.7 For 
example, data from the US and Swiss censuses show that because of labour segmentation in 
destination countries only about one third of migrants from Balkan countries with tertiary 
education have obtained skilled jobs (Lucas 2004). 
Table 2: Probability of Obtaining Skilled Jobs – Different Cohorts and Education Levels 
Cohort  
Education 
Level  
1990s Bachelor 1990s  Masters 
1990s 
Professional 1980s Bachelor 1970s Bachelor 
Bulgaria 37% 56% 65% 27% 0% 
Czech Republic 
and Slovakia 34% 52% 42% 32% 41% 
Hungary   55% 68% 87% 37% 60% 
Latvia   59% 73% 87% 50% 30% 
Lithuania  31% 50% 40% 61% 80% 
Moldova    49% 65% 56% 0% 17% 
Poland   35% 55% 65% 25% 35% 
Romania   40% 59% 70% 41% 40% 
Russia   45% 63% 61% 41% 49% 
Ukraine   39% 58% 62% 46% 29% 
Yugoslavia 
(former)  29% 49% 59% 21% 31% 
Source: Mattoo, Neagu and Özden, 2005, based on US Census 2000 data. 
There might be several explanations why the majority of highly skilled East European migrants 
working abroad are occupied in low-skilled jobs where their professional qualifications are not 
appropriately employed. Firstly, the lack of harmonisation between the educational systems 
within Europe implies that university diplomas from CEE countries may not be recognised 
elsewhere. Secondly, the mostly public-financed tertiary education sector produces graduates 
with country-specific skills rather than the internationally-applicable qualifications (Poutvaara 
2005). For instance, in Poland there is an overproduction of lawyers and graduates in psychology 
or philology, and on the other hand there are too few engineers. Thirdly, the imperfections of 
labour markets in receiving countries, especially the administrative barriers created to defend the 
native workers, make finding a skilled job for the foreigner very difficult, if not impossible. As a 
                                                            
7Given that the acquired knowledge of skilled workers is largely wasted, in the migration literature this effect is 
often referred to as a 'brain waste'. 
result brain waste effect, skilled immigrants from transitional countries receive, to a large extent, 
very low returns on their human capital. 
The migrant work skill downgrading in the destination countries affects the education decision of 
unskilled workers in home country. Because the majority of skilled migrants are employed in 
unskilled jobs abroad, a reduced skill premium creates disincentives for unskilled workers to 
enter education and acquire skills. Note that not only the potential migrants are affected, but 
through a lower international wage for labour also workers staying at home are affected in the 
source countries. As a result, less young people enter education and less unskilled workers want 
to become skilled. Thus, foreign wage signal will decrease the equilibrium education in the 
sending country. 
Next, we look at the impact of worker ability heterogeneity. Workers are not equally talented; 
they are highly heterogeneous in their ability to acquire education. The utility maximisation of 
workers implies that, in the presence of positive costs of education, only the most talented obtain 
education. This in turn implies that, on average, those workers which were unskilled before 
migration started are less talented than skilled workers who have first obtained education, 
suggesting that acquiring skills through education will be more costly for the remaining unskilled 
workers. As a result, after emigration of the most talented workers, home country will have less 
skilled workers in equilibrium than before migration. Thus, in the presence of worker 
heterogeneity, the emigration of most talented has an additional negative impact on human 
capital creation through education. 
The view that skilled migration will have a negative impact on human capital in sending 
countries is consistent with the theoretical models developed by Haque and Kim (1994) and 
Wong and Yip (1999). Each study also examines the impact of tax-financed education subsidies 
under high skill emigration and draws conclusions for education policy. 
Finally, we consider how education decision of workers in the sending country is affected by 
worker emigration if liquidity constraint is binding. The key aspect here are rents which 
emigrants receive in the destination country, because highly skilled workers, as other groups of 
migrants, tend to remit part of their income received abroad to their families in home country. 
According to Cox (1987), skilled worker remittances differ from unskilled worker remittances in 
at least two respects: quality and quantity. On the one hand, highly-skilled migrants remit less 
than unskilled because skilled migrants are more likely to settle and to reunite with their family 
in the receiving country. On the other hand, in contrast to unskilled worker remittances, which 
mostly are spent for consumption goods, remittances of skilled migrants are more often directed 
towards investment in production, fixed assets and education (World Bank 2000). 
These findings suggest that skilled worker remittances may move upward or completely remove 
the liquidity constraint of education. As a result, more workers, particularly those which were 
restrained from education by the liquidity constraint, are able to acquire skills through 
education.8 Thus, in poor countries remittances may help overcome liquidity constraints which 
                                                            
8According to World Bank (2000), especially for poor families in less developed economies remittances often help 
to cope with liquidity constraints locking the access to formal education. For example, World Bank (2000) reports 
that about 80% of remittances in Albania go to poor households. In more developed economies educational 
remittances provide access to a better education and training either at home or abroad. In both cases the remittance 
investment in education leads to more educated workforce and/or a better (higher quality) education resulting in 
more human capital. 
restrained worker access to education, increasing in such a way the equilibrium education in the 
sending country. 
Figure 1: Remittances as a share in GDP, 2004 
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Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics. 
The IMF estimates of income received from friends and relatives abroad as a proportion of the 
national income (GDP), suggest that they are particularly high in Moldova (30%), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (25%) and Albania (15%). These countries are among the world’s largest recipients 
of remittances as a portion of GDP. However, also other East European countries remittances are 
significant. 
In addition, there is plenty evidence that official remittance figures tend to undercount the actual 
flows as part of the transfers between migrants and their families occurs through informal 
networks. A World Bank (2006) survey indicates that between one-third and two-thirds of 
migrants, depending on their country of origin, tend to use informal channels to transmit 
remittances. Significant empirical evidence indicates that remittances lead to positive effect on 
economic growth, whether through increased consumption, savings or investment and have 
important multiplier effects (Lucas 2004, Ledesma and Piracha 2001). 
Summarising findings of this section we may conclude that, when accounting for induced effects 
triggered by skilled worker migration, the long-run education equilibrium will likely be different 
from the short-run education equilibrium. These differences stem from adjustments in relative 
wages, which do not take place in the short run but might be important in the long run. In this 
section we discussed four sources of induced adjustments in education equilibrium: changes in 
skilled/unskilled wage ratio in the sending country, skill downgrading effect in destination 
countries, education cost heterogeneity, and the impact of remittances on liquidity constraints. 
Given that two effects (the first and the fourth) have a positive impact on worker education, and 
two effects (the second and the third) work in opposite direction by decreasing the number of 
workers entering education, it is impossible to determine a priori the sign of the relationship 
between high skill emigration and the number of remaining workers acquiring skills through 
education. 
3.2 Long-run high-skill migration 
Next, we consider feed-back effects of high skill migration, which determine the long-run net 
migration of skilled labour. The equilibrium migration is determined by a trade-off between 
expected increase in earnings and migration cost. In the long-run, adjustments in relative wages 
will affect the equilibrium migration through several channels, which we aim to analyse in this 
section: changes in relative wages in home and host countries and changes in migration costs.9
Before considering the induced effects, we shortly summarise the direct brain drain effect of high 
skill emigration on human capital stock in the sending country, because it is the departure point 
for determining the long-run impact of skilled labour migration on human capital stock 
(Bhagwati and Hamada 1974). As above, because of exogenous cross-country wage differences 
skilled workers migrate from low wage source country to high wage receiving country. The 
direct and most visible effect of skilled worker migration is transfer of human capital embodied 
in labour.10 Assuming that skilled migrants can transfer neither more nor less human capital than 
embodied in their private productive skills, at the time of migration the stock of human capital in 
the sending country is monotonically declining in skilled worker emigration. This implies that 
the size of human capital diversion from source country to receiving country can be calculated 
by multiplying the number of skilled migrants by the average skill level of migrants. 
In the long run, skilled worker migration affects wages in home and host countries and migration 
costs, which in turn affect the migration decision itself. In order to determine the long-run impact 
of skilled worker migration on human capital stock in the sending country, it is important to 
account also for these induced effects. As pointed out in previous section, the high skill 
emigration will reduce labour supply in the sending country. If the demand for labour does not 
change (which is more likely to hold in tradable goods sectors than in sectors producing non-
tradable goods), a decreasing labour supply will exert an upward pressure on wages in home 
country. This implies that changes in home country's wages will narrow the migration-driving 
wage gap between source and destination countries, implying less migration in the long-run. 
Thus, wage flexibility has a positive impact on human capital stock in the source country. 
Several studies point to the fact that wages were drawn up in the sending countries through 
emigration. However, in most CEE countries emigration first helped to reduce labour market 
pressures in the time of rapid economic changes and adjustments and to decrease high 
unemployment. Only in the very recent years, emigration to Western Europe countries after the 
EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, emigration led to labour shortages in some fast growing 
CEE economies (such as the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria) which exert upward pressures 
on wages and wage increased by 20-30% annually exceeding productivity growth by far.  
According to Borjas (1994), international labour migration affects not only wage rate in the 
sending country but also in the destination country. The immigration of workers increases labour 
supply in the destination country which, in turn, will exert a downward pressure on wages. 
Lower wages in the destination country will narrow the migration-driving wage gap between the 
sending and receiving countries. Smaller wage differences will in turn attract fewer migrants. 
Less emigrating skilled workers imply higher human capital stock in the sending country. Thus, 
we may conclude that wage flexibility in the destination country has a positive impact on human 
                                                            
9In reality, there much more forces at work. For example, the economic geography and urban systems literature 
stress that because of agglomeration economies, firms in the larger region will be able to pay higher wages attracting 
in such a way even more workers. However, for the purpose of the present study, we abstract from these effects, as 
we think that at international scale they are less pronounced. 
 
10Given that the human capital embodied in skilled workers is draining out of country, in the migration literature this 
effect is often referred to as a 'brain drain'. 
capital stock in the sending country. The wage effect depends on the sending country's size - the 
larger the sending country, the bigger is the wage effect in the destination country. Some recent 
studies (Blanchflower et al. 2007, Gilpin et al. 2006, Wadensjö 2006) found out that no wage 
pressure can be observed in UK, Ireland or Sweden, after the latest EU enlargement as large 
inflows of CEE workers went to these countries.  
Workers care not only about the wage they may receive in the destination country but also about 
costs related to migration (Sjaastad 1962). Thus, workers trade the expected income increase off 
these costs. Workers migrate if the expected benefits arising from migration are higher than 
migration costs. Migration costs include not only the physical relocation costs but also 
employment uncertainty (which is higher abroad than at home), social costs of leaving family 
and/or friends behind, cultural adjustment costs etc. According to previous literature 
(Carrington, Detriagiache and Vishwanath 1996), migration costs are decreasing in source 
country's migrant stock in the receiving country. Declining migration costs in turn widen the net 
wage gap between source and destination countries attracting, in such a way, more migrants. 
Thus, through declining migration costs past migration has a positive impact on the next period's 
migration and, hence, a negative impact on human capital stock in the sending country. The 
major countries of destination with significant diasporas in EU countries are Germany and 
France for Serbia and Montenegro, Italy and Greece for Albania. More recently, after Ireland, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden allowed free movement of workers from CEE countries after the 
2004 EU enlargement. As a result, large communities of CEE migrants are building in these 
countries and creating migration networks for migrants from Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and 
Latvia. 
Summarising the potential impacts of high skill migration on long run net migration and hence 
development gap between East and West we may conclude that our theoretical findings are in 
line with empirical literature, where brain drain is found to be strictly negative for human capital 
stock in the sending country, at least in the short-run (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 2001; 
Lowell and Findlay 2001; Lucas 2004; Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani 2006). The size of the 
direct brain drain effect is proportional to the product of emigrating skilled workers and the 
average level of skills embodied in the migrating labour. The long-run migration impact on the 
human capital stock, however, is determined by three additional drivers of economic migration 
which are not present in the short run: the sending country's wage effect, the destination 
country's wage effect, and changes in migration costs.11 Adjustments in the sending country's 
wage rate and destination country's wage rate have a negative impact on migration and, hence, a 
positive impact on human capital stock in the sending country. In contrast, declining migration 
costs magnify the direct brain drain effect which, as discussed above, is negative for human 
capital stock in the sending country. 
3.3 Migration impact on domestic innovation 
This section analyses the impact of high skill migration on long-run innovation equilibrium 
which determines how much knowledge is created domestically. The two key determinants of 
national R&D activities is size of budget (government revenue) and budget share spent on R&D. 
                                                            
11 Other, non-economic drivers such as lacking infrastructure, political instability, distrust in domestic institutions, 
also affect migration decisions of individuals. 
We show that skilled labour migration affects both size and structure of government budget 
which in turn implies that, at least indirectly, the emigration of skilled workers affects the long-
run innovation equilibrium. In addition, the high skill emigration affects the R&D efficiency of 
remaining workers. 
We start with migration impact on size of government budget by considering the impact of 
highly skilled labour migration on government revenue. All workers contribute to government 
budget through tax payments. After emigrating, skilled workers do no contribute to the sending 
country's tax revenue anymore. Given that, on average, skilled workers are higher net 
contributors than unskilled workers, government revenue decreases due to fewer taxpayers in the 
origin country.12 Desai, Kapur and McHale (2004) found that net fiscal loss from high-skill 
emigrants from India to the US ranged from 0.24% to 0.58% of GDP per year depending on the 
estimation method. Lower tax revenue reduces government budget allowing for less expenditure 
on science, research and development, which in turn slows down the accumulation of knowledge 
capital under the assumption that the share of R&D expenditure in the budget remains constant. 
In contrast, higher tax revenue and larger budget in the destination country imply that more 
expenditure can be devoted towards knowledge creation resulting in higher knowledge capital in 
the long-run; however, this revenue might also be used to increase social spending (see also the 
discussion below). 
A further argument for high skill drain widened development gap is the loss of public spending 
in the education of emigrants. Considering that in CEE countries education is mainly publicly 
funded (see Table 3) and that this publicly subsidised higher education often serves as a vehicle 
to leave the country, then the merits of the publicly subsidised tertiary education may well be 
doubted (Lucas 2004). 
Table 3: Public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP 
1991 2001 2004
Belarus 5.7 6.0 5.7
Bulgaria 5.4 3.5 4.2
Croatia 5.5 4.5 4.5
Czech Rep. 4.0 4.1 4.4
Estonia 6.9 5.3 5.1
Hungary 6.1 5.0 5.4
Latvia 4.1 5.5 5.1
Lithuania 5.5 5.9 5.2
Poland 5.2 5.3 5.4
Moldova 5.3 4.3 4.2
Romania 3.5 3.3 3.4
Russia 3.6 3.1 3.5
Serbia 4.2 3.3
Slovakia 5.6 4.0 4.2
Slovenia 4.8 6.1 6.0
Macedonia 4.1 3.5
Turkey 2.4 3.7 4.0
Ukraine 6.2 4.7 5.3  
                                                            
12Because on average the wage rate for skilled work is higher than for unskilled and the unemployment rate among 
skilled workers is lower, per capita, skilled workers contribute more to tax revenue than unskilled workers. 
 
Source: UNESCO Education database. 
Next, we show how skilled worker emigration affects the structure of government budget. More 
precisely, we analyse the impact of migration on the share of R&D expenditure. Skilled worker 
migration affects the share of R&D expenditure through changed ratio of skilled/unskilled 
workers in the source country: skilled worker share in the total workforce (and population) 
decreases whereas the share of unskilled workers increases.13 Given that workers are also voters, 
the voting power of unskilled workers increases relative to that of skilled workers in the case of 
high-skill emigration. Usually, the political interests of the two worker groups are different. For 
example, the demand for social redistribution policies is higher by low-paid unskilled workers, 
whereas the demand for government investment in research and development is higher by skilled 
workers. Shifts in the relative voting power between the two worker groups will change the 
demand for specific policies which in turn may affect the structure of government expenditure in 
the sending country. In the case of skilled worker emigration, a shift in relative voting power 
towards unskilled workers would result in a higher demand for social redistribution policies and 
less future-oriented investment (e.g. R&D expenditure). Lower government expenditure share on 
research and development would in turn slow down the accumulation of knowledge capital in the 
sending country. The adverse impact of skilled migration on public spending in source countries 
was first mentioned in Kancs and Ciaian (2008). For a broader discussion for reasons driving the 
emergence of neo-socialism in Central and Eastern Europe see Cook et al (1999). 
Table 4 provides an overview on how much different CEE countries spend on R&D. Whereas 
the Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia spend over 1% of their GDP on R&D, other 
countries devote much smaller share of their national budget. 
Table 4: Total gross domestic expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Bulgaria 0.52% 0.51% 0.57% 0.57% 0.52% 0.47% 0.49% 0.50% 0.51% 0.50%
Croatia 0.99% 1.23% 1.07% 1.11% 1.11% 1.22%
Czech Republic 0.97% 1.08% 1.15% 1.14% 1.21% 1.20% 1.20% 1.25% 1.26% 1.42%
Estonia 0.58% 0.70% 0.62% 0.73% 0.75% 0.82% 0.91% 0.99%
Hungary 0.65% 0.72% 0.68% 0.69% 0.79% 0.94% 1.01% 0.94% 0.89% 0.95%
Latvia 0.42% 0.39% 0.41% 0.37% 0.44% 0.40% 0.42% 0.38% 0.42% 0.57%
Lithuania 0.51% 0.55% 0.55% 0.51% 0.59% 0.67% 0.66% 0.67% 0.76% 0.76%
Macedonia 0.38% 0.43% 0.35% 0.44% 0.32% 0.26% 0.23% 0.25% 0.25%
Moldova 0.87% 0.81%
Poland 0.65% 0.65% 0.67% 0.69% 0.64% 0.62% 0.56% 0.54% 0.56% 0.57%
Romania 0.71% 0.58% 0.49% 0.40% 0.37% 0.39% 0.38% 0.39% 0.39%
Russian Fed 0.97% 1.04% 0.95% 1.00% 1.05% 1.18% 1.25% 1.28% 1.16% 1.07%
Serbia and Montenegro 2.12% 2.08% 1.49% 2.13% 1.17% 1.18% 1.24% 1.37% 1.41%
Slovakia 0.92% 1.09% 0.79% 0.66% 0.65% 0.64% 0.58% 0.58% 0.53% 0.52%
Slovenia 1.33% 1.31% 1.37% 1.41% 1.43% 1.55% 1.52% 1.32% 1.45% 1.22%
Ukraine 1.12% 1.00% 0.89% 0.88% 1.02% 1.00% 1.11% 1.08% 1.07%  
Source: UNESCO Research and development database. 
Finally, we consider the scale effect of national R&D activities. According to the knowledge 
production function of Romer (1990), new knowledge is produced using existing ideas and 
human capital resources seeking out new ideas at a point in time as inputs. The progression from 
tinkers to R&D labs with trained scientists and engineers is usually attributed to a 'fishing out' 
effect in innovation creation (Furman, Porter and Stern 2002). The earliest discoveries are those 
                                                            
13The increasing share of unskilled workers results from the assumption that the ratio of skilled/unskilled migrants is 
higher than the ratio of skilled/unskilled domestic workforce (positive selection, Borjas 1987). 
ideas that require the least amount of scientific knowledge. Subsequent discoveries are harder 
and require a more complete understanding of scientific principles. The fishing out hypothesis is 
consistent with the observation made by Jones (1995) that although the number of research 
scientists and engineers has increased significantly over the post-war period there has been no 
accompanying increase in the rate of economic growth in the U.S. economy. According to Abdih 
and Joutz (2006), the larger the number of people searching for ideas is, the more likely it is that 
duplication or overlap in innovation would occur. As a result, doubling the number of 
researchers, the number of unique ideas or discoveries is less than double, and halving are more 
than double. This notion of duplication in research or the 'stepping on toes' effect has been found 
to be empirically significant (Furman, Porter and Stern 2002). The decreasing returns of 
innovation output with respect to the number of people seeking out new ideas suggest that the 
emigration of skilled workforce might increase the innovative output per researcher. 
The third effect - decreasing returns to scale of knowledge - has the opposite sign to the changes 
in political support effect. Because of decreasing returns of knowledge to human capital, a lower 
stock of skilled labour in sending country implies that the efficiency of public spending on 
knowledge increases. There are important reallocation effects between policy transfers on 
knowledge creation and redistributive transfers. Because of higher relative political benefits from 
knowledge than from redistribution policies, the equilibrium redistributive transfers decrease, 
while growth related transfers increase. 
Findings from this section suggest that skilled worker emigration affects size and structure of 
government budget, as well as the efficiency of national R&D activities. This in turn implies 
that, at least indirectly, the emigration of skilled workers affects the long-run innovation 
equilibrium. If the share of skilled worker in migrant population is higher than in home 
population, and political preferences are different between skilled and unskilled workers, then 
both fiscal effects (size and structure) decrease the domestically created knowledge capital. In 
contrast, if the 'fishing out' effect dominates the 'standing on shoulders' effect (Caballero and 
Jaffe 1993), then the R&D efficiency effect has a positive impact on knowledge capital in the 
sending country. These findings allow us to conclude that in the long-run skilled labour 
migration will likely reduce the total creation of knowledge capital but increase the innovative 
capital output per worker in the sending country. 
3.4 Migration impact on knowledge spillover 
This section analyses the impact of skilled labour migration on knowledge spillovers between 
migrant source and destination countries, as it co-determines how much knowledge capital is 
available domestically. The equilibrium level of knowledge spillover is determined by two 
opposite forces: the advantage of country backwardness and country's absorptive capacity. 
Skilled worker migration affects the absorptive capacity through three channels: human capital 
capability and 'adaptive' research capacity, and the cost of international knowledge transmission. 
We start with human capital absorptive capability which, together with 'adaptive' research 
capacity, limits the upper bound of knowledge convergence between countries. New ideas and 
knowledge generated in other countries can only be adopted in home country if the necessary 
'adoptive' technologies and human capital resources are available. Therefore, the availability of 
highly skilled workers largely determines country's capability to adopt foreign technology and to 
use imported ideas in own knowledge capital creation. For example, even if an innovative 
information technology developed in a frontier economy is available at no user cost in the 
transition country, the transition country can only benefit from it if the necessary human 
resources are available for applying the imported technology. Eaton and Kortum (1996) identify 
knowledge flows through cross country patenting and find that a country's level of education 
plays a significant role in the ability to absorb foreign ideas. These results suggest that 
emigration of highly skilled workers decreases country's ability to benefit from technological 
spillovers. 
In addition, country's absorptive capacity depends on investment in R&D activities which, as 
partly shown in section 3.3, depends on the size of domestic workforce (taxpayers). According to 
Geroski (1995), the size of national R&D expenditure is important not only for own innovation 
production but also for 'adaptive' research activities, because in order to be able to adopt or 
improve the knowledge generated by other countries, a country has to invest in 'imitative' or 
'adaptive' research activities. Indeed, Geroski's argument has sample empirical validation. At 
firm level the econometric studies of Cohen and Levinthal (1989) illustrate that the firm's own 
R&D activity enhances its absorptive capacity of innovations generated by other firms. 
Furthermore, the survey results of Mansfield (1981) show that imitation costs on average are 
about 65 percent of the original innovation costs. At country level Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
(2001) tested this hypothesis by interacting foreign R&D with business R&D intensity for each 
country. Their results show that the impact of domestic R&D intensity on the elasticity of foreign 
R&D is positive and significant. Thus, in order to take a full advantage of international 
spillovers, a lagging behind country has to invest in 'adaptive' research activities. These findings 
suggest that national absorptive capacity is increasing in 'adaptive' research activities and 
decreasing in skilled labour migration, which reduces tax revenue for such activities.14
Next, we consider how skilled labour migration affects knowledge transmission costs. The effect 
of natural barriers, such as distance, on knowledge spillovers has been investigated both 
nationally and internationally. Many studies (e.g. Jaffe et al 1993, Acs et al 1994, and Audretsch 
and Feldman 1996) have argued that knowledge spillovers are rather localised. Jaffe et al (1993) 
find that a patent is typically 30 to 80 percent more likely to cite other patents whose inventors 
reside in the same country, than patents from other countries. This suggests that cross-border 
mobility of knowledge is limited and that knowledge spillovers are spatially localised. Maurseth 
and Verspagen (2002) use citations between European regions to estimate the effect of distance 
on knowledge flows. Their results indicate that distance has a negative impact on knowledge 
flows and that this impact is substantial. They find knowledge flows to be larger within countries 
than between regions located in separate countries, as well as within regions sharing the same 
language (but not necessarily belonging to the same country). Findings from Peri (2003) and 
other studies suggest that knowledge flows locally more easily than at a distance. This in turn 
implies that personal contacts of migrants may represent a significant knowledge transmission 
mechanism. Indeed, Kapur (2001) argues that skilled worker migration facilitates the spillover of 
knowledge, technology and business contacts from destination countries, by interacting as a 
carrier between knowledge producing country and knowledge absorbing country. In migration 
literature this effect is known as diaspora effect. Based on these findings we may conclude that 
skilled worker migration increases knowledge spillover from migrant destination countries to 
home countries. 
                                                            
14 'Adaptive' research activities may also be funded by private companies. 
In addition, labour migration may also affect the ratio of national/international knowledge 
spillovers. Generally, the number of researchers is lower the smaller a country is. Hence the 
probability that the peers with whom skilled workers interact are located abroad is higher when 
skilled workers are from a small country. Proxying the economic size of a country by its labour 
force, the emigration of skilled workers will decrease country size and increase the probability of 
international (as opposite to national) exchange of ideas. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001) 
test this 'size effect' hypothesis by interacting foreign R&D with an indicator of size for each 
country and confirm that smaller countries do benefit more from foreign R&D than larger ones. 
However, the increasing international knowledge spillovers are offset by decreasing national 
knowledge spillovers. Therefore, the net effect of the changed national/internation knowledge 
flows will unlikely be significant and, in the presence of positive knowledge transmission costs 
between countries, might be even negative. 
Summarising findings from this section we may conclude that skilled labour migration affects 
knowledge spillover between migrant source and destination countries at least through three 
channels. We identify two effects which might restrict international knowledge spillovers: 
human capital capability to adopt imported technologies and national R&D expenditure for 
'adaptive' research activities in the sending country. The third effect, which rather facilitates 
international knowledge infusion: knowledge transmission cost effect. The presence of two 
knowledge diffusion limiting forces and one augmenting force does not allow us to make general 
predictions about sign of the relationship between high skill migration, international knowledge 
spillovers and development gap between East and West. 
Conclusions 
Adopting the innovative capital framework of Kancs and Ciaian (2008), the present study 
analysis the potential impacts of high skill labour migration in general on innovative capital in 
the sending countries. In line with previous studies (e.g. Beine et al. 2001; Lowell and Findlay 
2001; Katseli et al. 2006), we find that in the short- to medium-term high skill migration 
decreases national innovative capital and hence growth perspectives in the Eastern Europen 
sending countries. 
Summarising our findings we may conclude that high skill migration affects economic growth in 
source and destination countries through a variety of channels: knowledge stock through worker 
education, long-run net migration of skilled workers, domestic knowledge creation activities and 
international knowledge spillovers. Given that the emigration of highly skilled workforce has 
both positive and negative impacts on key drivers of economic growth, the net impact of high 
skill migration depends on many factors and will likely be different from country to country and 
cannot be generalised based on theoretical predictions. Moreover, we found that the impact of 
high skill migration is likely to by different in the short run from the long run perspective, if 
centripetal forces of Diaspora high skill are strong enough. These results are in line with previous 
studies on high skill migration. The negative short-term effects are likely to be overturned by 
more positive long-term effects. Furthermore, there are important factors which are rather 
specific to Eastern Europe transition countries, they are small and open catching-up economies, 
where interaction and networking with more developed countries is of underlying significance 
and therefore diaspora effects might be very important. In the long run, there is also a possibility 
of return migration which is also associated with positive knowledge transmission to the sending 
country but not discussed in this paper. 
In contrast to previous studies we examine the impact of high skill migration not only on the 
formation of human capital, but we also consider the migration’s impact on knowledge capital in 
the sending countries. Indeed, we find that the emigration of highly skilled affect both the 
production and the attracting of knowledge capital. Several impact channels are new in the 
literature and have not been mentioned before. These findings suggest that in the long-run the 
adverse implications of high skill emigration on Eastern country growth perspectives might be 
even larger through reduced knowledge capital than through reduced human capital. If the return 
migration policies are attractive enough, the migrants can be attracted back to home in a 
relatively short period of time. In contrast, the creation of knowledge capital requires a 
considerably longer time period. Hence, our key policy conclusion is while focusing on reducing 
the flow of leaving highly skilled, not to loose the attention from other important general 
equilibrium aspects co-determining long term growth prospects of Eastern Europe. 
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